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POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE IN IRAQ

ZAKIA AFRIN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

It was just like another video from the extremists showing live

beheadings of human beings. Perhaps it may have been a replica of one
of the episodes of the Roman Empire when crowds enjoyed people being
eaten alive by beasts in the Coliseum. Instead, the hanging of Saddam
Hussein, the fallen ruler of Iraq, was an act of a special tribunal and an
elected government. At 6 a.m. Iraqi time on December 30, 2006, when
Muslims in many parts of the world were celebrating the most important
holiday of their faith, Eid ul Fitr,! the Iraqi President was humiliated in
front of the world and hung. For many, this is the picture of post-conflict
justice in Iraq. I beg to differ. The final moments of Saddam Hussein
are in no way representative of an otherwise impressive effort to pursue
justice in post-conflict Iraq.
In the endeavor to create democracy based on the notion of a "Rule of
Law," perhaps the most daunting task of the Transitional Authority (T A)2

*

Adjunct Professor or Law at Golden Gate University School of Law.
I.
Popularly known as Eid, this is the most significant Muslim festival celebrated once a year
after a month-long fast known as Ramadan.
2. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Iraqi Governing Council (lGC), Interim
Government (lG) and Transitional Administration governed Iraq in the capacity of temporary
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in Iraq had been the administration of justice. The traditional definition
of justice, as discussed by Plato,3 can be adapted to a post-conflict
situation. Paul Van Zyl, the executive secretary of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, solicits a very broad and
moving definition of justice:

beyond
focusing purely on the conduct of
perpetrators, to include the needs of victims and the
imperative to reform state institutions to ensure that
human rights abuses does not recur. "4
H •••

This definition contemplates two aspects of justice:
1. Retributive and restorative justice leading to a peaceful future. s
2. Repairing and enhancing the judicial system.
In a post-conflict situation, the second approach is usually given less
attention. 6 The first approach is criticized by many scholars as part of the
ongoing debate that evolves around the notion whether seeking justice in
a post-conflict situation is an impediment to peace. 7 In the case of Iraq,
however, the expectation of retributive justice was undisputed among the
population. At the same time, the role of the occupiers required
compliance with international obligation to restore law and order, which
translated into restoring and enhancing the judicial system. Thus, in
post-conflict Iraq, justice meant holding Saddam's government liable for
its thirty-five years worth of atrocities against Iraqi citizens and

government from May 2003 to 2006 after a us led occupation force ousted the government of Iraq
and form the UN recognized Transitional Authority of Iraq.
In his 'The Republic' Plato discusses the notion of justice through conversation between
3.
Socrates and his interlocutors. Plato's own arguments may be summarized to mean justice as the task
of society according to one's natural abilities. Plato, The Republic (360 BC).
4.
For Paul Van Zyl's analysis 0 f the Velasquez Rodriguez Judgment at 4 Iner-Am. Ct. H. R.
(Ser.C) 1988 defining justice see Paul van Zyl, Unfinished Business: The Truth and Reconciliation
Commission's Contribution to Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in Post-Conflict Justice
745-46 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 2002).
5.
Retributive justice seeks to inflict punishment on the offenders for violations of law
whereas restorative justice puts major emphasis on the harm committed to human relationships and
aims to achieving social harmony in the aftermath of a conflict. Restorati ve justice may include
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions.
As Cherif Bassiouni observed, " major western powers find it more politically congruent to
6.
their interests to establish ad-hoc post-conflict justice systems which are essentially focused on the
past and without much regard for justice capacity building of national systems" M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Post Conflict Justice xvii (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transational Publishers Inc. 2(02).
7.
Neil J Kritz, Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-Conflict Justice
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2(02).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol14/iss1/3

2

Afrin: Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq

2008]

POST -CONFLICT JUSTICE

25

reconstructing the judicial system while also introducing the notion of an
independent jUdiciary.
In this article, I analyze the TA's approach and initiative regarding
post-conflict justice in Iraq. Describing the actions of the authority, I
seek to answer three questions: first, did the statute of the special tribunal
meet international standards? Second, did the trial of Saddam Hussein
serve to satisfy the goals of post-conflict justice? Third, did the TA's
actions associated with reconstructing the justice system comply with its
mandate under international law?

II. ESTABLISHING THE
PROSECUTING SADDAM

SPECIAL

TRmUNAL

FOR

"In the short span of ten years between 1992 and 2002,
the values of international criminal justice have taken
hold as an essential component of the international legal
order. "8

The world has truly come a long way since the days of the Nuremberg
Trial,9 the first international criminal tribunal of its kind, criticized for its
partiality and attitudes towards the victors. The establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)\O and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)II in the 1990s
supported criminal liability for atrocities committed towards citizens by
their own governments. Further, the tribunals also integrated the rules of
fair trials, rights of the accused, compensation for the victims, and many
other progressive features of international legal order. 12
The
International Criminal Court (ICC) treaty,13 however, elevated
8.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post Conflict Justice xvi (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transational
Publishers Inc. 2(02).
9. For a full overview of the Nuremberg Trials and available documents, please see
http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edulphp/docs_swi.php?DI=I&text=overview (last viewed on March
21,2(08).
10. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (lCTY) was established by
the UN through SC Res. 827 on May 25 1991 to prosecute the perpetrators of the Yugoslav war in
1991. For more information on the Court see International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, http://www.un.orglicty/.
II. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established by the UN through SC
Res.955 of November 8, 1994 to prosecute the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. For
more information on the Court, see International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, hup:/l69.94.l1.53/.
12. For example, both the ICTY and ICTR provide broad definitions of war crimes, crimes
against humanity, rape and other sexual assaults.
13. The International Criminal Court, a permanent tribunal to prosecute genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression was created by an international treaty in
2002. Independent of the UN, the current member of this court is 104. For more information on the
Court see International Criminal Court, hup:/lwww.icc-cpi.intl .
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international criminal law to a new, higher standard when it came into
existence in 2002. Heralded as the flrst gender-sensitive legislation l4 in
international law, the ICC has strengthened the concept of international
responsibility for domestic affairs of governments. This trend continues
today with several tribunals set up to address post-conflict justice
issues. ls
In this backdrop, it was only natural that Iraq's fallen government had to

face a special tribunal kind of justice for the killings of its own citizens.16
The flrst issue before the Transitional Authority was choosing a proper
forum. Among the choices were an ICTY-type international tribunal, an
East Timor-type combination of national and international tribunal, and
an Iraqi tribunal created solely for the purposes of trying international
crimes without any international influence.
Despite expectations of an international criminal tribunal from the NGO
communities, the TA favored an Iraqi tribunal. 17 The U.S. administration
reportedly preferred the local institution so that the Iraqi people would
feel more in charge of the events. Anything less than the death penalty
for Saddam would not have likely been acceptable to the people though
impossible under international standards. IS Tom Parker, the head of the
Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) crimes against humanity unit,
noted that after verifying the interest level in the different types of
tribunals, the authorities preferred the idea of a national tribunal. 19 He
also argued that after a brutal sanctions regime, there was little interest of
any UN involvement among the people. He failed to answer, however,

14. For a complete discussion see Zakia Afrin and Amy Schwartz, A human rights instrument
that works for women: The ICC as a tool for gender justice,(Wilson, Sengupta and Evans Edited
Defending our dreams: Global feminists voices for a new generation, Zed Books 2005).
15. Consider the case of Sierra Leone. After a ten year long bloody civil war, the government
of Sierra Leone in agreement with the UN SC Res.1315 of 2000 set up the Special Court for Sierra
Leone that combined both international and domestic legal traditions to prosecute serious violation
of international humanitarian law. See The Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.orgl.
16. The backdrop of international trend to hold governments responsible in special tribunals
for violations of international criminal law.
17. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special
Tribunal, in 38 Cornell Int'I L.J. 328, 328-368 (2005) (detailed discussion on the process of
choosing to establish an Iraqi tribunal as observed by the author in the capacity of director of
International Human Rights Law Institute's reconstruction of legal education program funded by the
US AID in Iraq).
18.
Id. at 344.
19. Tom Parker, Prosecuting Saddam: The Coalition Provisional Authority and the Evolution
of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 Cornell Int'! L.J. 899, 899-907 (2005) (According to Tom Parker,
as early as April 2003, OHRTJ began to reach out to Iraqi legal community and local human rights
groups. By August 2003 report titled 'Iraqi Voices' from International Centre for Transitional Justice
(ICTJ) and Human Rights Centre (HRC) at University of California at Berkeley, claimed
overwhelmed support for a national tribunal to try Saddam).
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why a court set up with the blessings of an occupier would be more
acceptable than a recognized world institution.
The proposal for the tribunal initiated from CPA allies and the
Governing Council. The Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) which carried out the
infamous trial of Saddam Hussein came into existence as the Iraqi
Special Tribunal (1ST) on December 10, 2003. The CPA authorized the
1ST statute (promulgated by the Governing Council) to "try Iraqi
nationals or residents of Iraq accused of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes or violations of certain Iraqi law."20 In August of
2005, the national assembly of the Transnational Government revoked
the 1ST and replaced it with the IHT. Unlike the IHT which drew mostly
from Iraqi domestic law, the 1ST was set to utilize a combination of
international and domestic criminal laws.
Per the ICC treaty, the IHT had jurisdiction over Iraqi cItizens and
residents accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity
from July 1968 through May 2003. 21 The IHT also had jurisdiction over
various crimes punishable under Iraqi criminal law. 22 The inclusion of
offenses mentioned in the 1958 Iraqi penal code, which lack transparent
definitions, raised concerns over the potential of abuse for political
purposes. 23 Any trial would have to be regulated by Iraqi criminal
procedure, which derived its roots from civil legal traditions. According
to the rules, an investigative judge would collect all the evidence and
witness testimonies for use in the trial proceedings.24
There are five judges in the trial chamber who decide on the appearances
of the witnesses and the questions they answer.25 After being presented
with the documents collected by the investigative judge, witness
testimonies, and prosecution and defense arguments, trial judges deliver
a verdict and a written opinion on the case. The verdict may be appealed
before the Appeals chamber of the IHT which consist of nine judges,

20.
Coalition Provisional Order Number 48,
http://www.iraqcoalition.orglregulations/20031210_CPAORD_48_IST_and_Append ix_A. pdf.
21.
The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Article I, II, 12 and 13,
http://www.iraq-iht.orglenlstaute.html.
22.
[d. at Article 14.
In its October 16,2005 briefing paper on The Former Iraqi Government on Trial, Human
23.
Rights Watch considers crimes mentioned in Article 14 as 'political offenses and of a breadth and
vagueness that makes them susceptible to politicized interpretation and application' The Former
Iraqi Government on Trial, A Human Rights Watch briefing paper, October 16,2005 retrieved from
http://hrw.orglbackgrounder/mena/iraql005/(Last visited April 16, 2007)
24.
[d. at 3.
25.
The Staute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Article 4.1,
http://www.iraq-iht.orglenlstaute.html.
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including a President of the TribunaJ.26 According to the statute, judges,
prosecutors, the principle defense lawyer of the accused, and all staff
members of the IHT must be Iraqi nationals. 27 Non-Iraqi international
law experts may be appointed in an advisory capacity to assist judges and
prosecutors in matters of international legal issues. 28
The IHT granted an impressive set of rights to the accused, including
equality before the law, presumption of innocence until proven guilty,
and a fair trial. Armed with international criminal law elements and
promise of a fair trial, the IHT was hailed as an exemplary domestic
institution to try war crimes and similar government entities. The
Saddam trial generated a great deal of interest among international legal
experts who waited keenly to witness the advancement of international
criminal law in a domestic forum.

III. TRIAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
Saddam Hussein's government was infamous for the systematic killing
of political dissidents. It is estimated that between 1968 and 2003, the
Iraqi government was responsible for the murder of 500,000 Iraqis. 29
The first case in front of the Tribunal was the Dujali case, where Saddam
and other members of his regime were accused of killing 148 Shias in
Dujali in 1982. Among the most criticized issues of the Saddam trial
were legitimacy, fair trial, capital punishment, and execution.
The legitimacy of the previous 1ST was harshly criticized by Bassiouni, a
leading expert in the field on international criminal law. Mentioning the
CPA's illegal invasion of Iraq he stated:

No norms or precedents exist in international law for an
occupying power, the legitimacy of which is in doubt, to
establish an exceptional national criminal tribunal. 30
Bassiouni predicted that as soon as the tribunal would be repromulgated
by a national legislative authority, the legitimacy problem would be
solved. It can be argued that the IHT was indeed promulgated by the
elected national assembly, thus perfectly legitimate in the legal sense.
Id. at Article 4.2.
Id. at Article 28 and 22.4.
Id. at Article 9.2, 10.9, and 11.7.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post Conflict Justice in Iraq: All Appraisal of the Iraqi Special
Tribunal, 38 Cornell Int'l L.I. 330, (2005).
30.
Id. at 359.
26.
27.
28.
29.
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However, this argument seems problematic as the election of the national
assembly was administered during a period dominated by the CPA and
the occupation. In its Appellate Chamber opinion, the IHT tried to
answer the question of legitimacy, as put forth by the accused, by
pointing out that the court was created by an elected government that
garnered the support of 78% of the Iraqi population. 3l Nevertheless, the
tribunal, as an initiative of the transitional government, will most likely
always have the "legitimacy stigma" attached.
Another criticism of the court again draws on the issue of sovereignty.
The visible involvement of the CPA authorities and US officials was
subsequently met with the argument that the tribunal could not act
without the United States' influence. Bassiouni argues that the visible
role of the US was due to the fact that experts from the US Department
of Justice, who, in March of 2004, arrived to gather evidence to be used
in the trial and to train the judges and prosecutors of the tribunal, did not
have adequate knowledge of the Iraqi legal system and the legal culture
of the region. 32 Whatever the reason may have been, the US involvement
continued until the end of the trial, thereby damaging the perceived
independence of the court
Apart from the execution of the death penalty, the Tribunal was criticized
from two different aspects. First, the retention of the death penalty,
which contradicted a well-established anti-death penalty rule of
international law was, at the very least, questionable. Despite CPA's
dissatisfaction with this choice, the Governing Council and later on the
Interim administration, insisted on retaining capital punishment
consistent with the existing Iraqi penal code. Tom Parker also argued
that such decisions are the prerogative of the sovereign. Though it is
tempting to believe in the superiority of the sovereign, this argument
cannot be given weight as it would justify, in the name of sovereignty, all
state-sanctioned human rights abuses that violate international legal
standards. 33
Second, according to one view, the death penalty was carried out in
violation of the Iraqi code of criminal procedure which allows an
31.
Appellate Chamber Opinion of IHT, December 26 2006. An unofficial English translation
of the opinion, available at,
http://law.case.edulsaddamtriaVdocumentsl2oo70103_dujail_appellate_chamber_opinion. pdf.
32. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraqi Special
Tribunal, 38 Cornell Int'l L.J. 330, 346 (2005).
33.
For example, many states do not ratify International Covenant on Civil and Political Right
(1976) or Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)
claiming that it would jeopardize their sovereign right to regulate legal affairs in a country.
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additional 30 days after the first appeal for the convicted to request a
correction of errors in judgment. 34 In rebuttal, Professor Scharf pointed
out that the provision of the tribunal requiring execution within thirty
days of the Appeals Chamber's decision prevailed over any domestic
law, as it was a special court independent of the domestic court system. 35
Though both arguments have merits, Professor Scharf s point must
prevail in this case.
Besides these scholars, few international legal experts and human rights
organizations kept a close watch on the Dujali trial. As fierce critics of
the invasion of Iraq, these entities have sought a greater UN role in
prosecuting Saddam Hussein, or at least for a court independent of US
influence. 36 Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that the US neither
followed a transparent process of consulting Iraqis nor assessed Iraqi
attitudes about justice and accountability.37 Multiple requests from HRW
and other human rights organizations to comment on the draft statute of
the Tribunal were turned down. In a report entitled "Iraq: Dujali Trial
Fundamentally Flawed" released on November 20, 2006, HRW also
argued that the trial had enough serious procedural and administrative
flaws to render it unfair and requested overturning the verdict. 38
Calling the trial deeply "flawed and unfair" Amnesty International's
Middle East and North Mrica Director said:
34. Professor Kevin Jon Heller argues that according to Paragraph 266 of the Iraqi Code of
Criminal Procedure "the convicted person ... may request the correction of a legal error in the
decision issued by the Court of Cassation, provided the request is submitted within 30 days, counted
from the date a convicted, imprisoned or detained person is notified of the Court of Cassation
decision" which means that after the Appeals Chamber rejected Saddam' s plea, he had another thirty
days to ask the court to correct its legal errors. As Rule 66 of the llIT Rules of Evidence and
Procedure explicitly requires the judgment to be in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure,
executing Saddam before the lapse of thirty days violated the lliT procedure .. Michael P. Scharf,
Gregory S. McNeal & Brianne M. Draffin, A Teacher's Guide and Supplement to Saddam on Trial:
Understanding and Debating the Iraqi High Tribunal (2007).
35.
Professor Michael P. Scharf further mentioned, 'This was an important approach as the
llIT Statute was written to import the rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and there were many provisions of the Iraqi Criminal Procedural Law of 1971 that
were not consistent with those rights. The drafters thus intended the provisions of the llIT Statute to
control.".
36. Two of the most influential NOO's worldwide, Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch (HRW).
37. The Former Iraqi Government on Trial, A Human Rights Watch briefmg paper, October
16,2005 retrieved from http://hrw.orglbackgrounder/menaliraql005/(Lastvisited April 16, 2007)
38. In the 97 page report, HRW reports procedural flaws in the trial including:
-Regular failure to disclose key evidence, including exculpatory evidence, to the defense in advance;
-Violations of the defendants' basic fair trial right to confront witnesses against them;
-Lapses of judicial demeanor that undermined the apparent impartiality of the presiding judge; and
-Important gaps in evidence that undermine the persuasiveness of the prosecution case, and put in
doubt whether all the elements of the crimes charged were established.
Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.orgienglish/docs/2006/l1nO/iraqI4589.htm.
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"[Saddam Hussein's] overthrow opened the opportunity
to restore the basic right [to a fair trial] and, at the
same time, to ensure, fairly, accountability for the
crimes of the past. It is an opportunity missed and made
worse by the imposition of the death penalty. "39
Amnesty International also voiced concerns about Saddam Hussein being
denied his right to a defense attorney for the first year of the trial, the
assassination of three defense lawyers during the trial, the resignation of
a judge on grounds of partiality, and overall political interference by the
US throughout the proceedings.40
The llIT promised a fair trial for the accused. As a state party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights41, the notion of a fair
trial entails a handful of rights to Iraqis, including the right to an
impartial tribunal and adequate time for the preparation of a defense. 42
The worldwide media reported throughout the trial about the murders of
the defense lawyers, boycott of the trial by lawyers, and open
proclamations of the judges about the guilt of the accused well before the
verdict was delivered. The mode of execution, where Saddam Hussein
was seen being executed and taunted by executioners, was an
unprecedented event in the history of criminal justice and further
strengthened the claim of an unfair process of the Dujali trial.
Apart from the above instances, in theory the tribunal met international
standards for holding a fair trial. 43 The Dujali trial had a public hearing
by an allegedly independent tribunal where Saddam Hussein exercised
the right to retain defense counsel and call witnesses. Saddam Hussein
was found gUilty after all the evidence was considered and witnesses
testified against him. His punishment was also consistent with the
tribunal rules as well as the common practice of the country. The fact
that Saddam Hussein was brought to trial without being arbitrarily
detained or executed is in itself a triumph for the notion of the rule of law
39. Amnesty Intnernal, Amnesty International deplores death sentences in Saddam Hussein
trial, http://news.arnnesty.orglindexlENGMDEI40372006 (Nov. 5 2006).
40. See note 38, supra.
41. Iraq is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (lCCPR) G.A.
res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, entered into!orce Mar. 23,1976. Complete text can be found at
http://www.unhchr.ch/htmVmenu3/b/a3cpr.htm.
42. The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Article 14(1) (3)(a)-(g),
http://www.iraq-iht.orglenlstaute.htrnl#.
43.
According to the UDHR (Article 10, 11), ICCPR (Article 14, 15) and ECHR (Article 6),
the basic components of a fair trial include a fair and public hearing in an independent tribunal,
presumption of innocence, and right to defense counsel.
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in Iraq. The handling of the trial may have been unsatisfactory pursuant
to today's human rights standards, but it cann~t be simply labeled as an
unfair trial.

IV. REPAIRING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
"The effective reconstruction of the justice sector
requires a coherent approach that places equal
emphasis on all its elements: police, prosecution,
judiciary, and the correctional system. "44
This statement, describing the reconstruction of East Timor and Kosovo,
communicates the huge responsibility that the TA faced in Iraq. During
political negotiations in a post-conflict environment, regular criminal
activities do not necessarily cease. In the case of Iraq, there has been a
significant escalation of looting, vandalizing, robbery, etc. The risk of
losing valuable documents of the government or proof of abuses of the
previous administration had also been high. A working criminal justice
system was thus a priority from any point of view.
One of the pillars of the criminal justice system is policing. In the
beginning of the occupation, the coalition forces began policing for the
courts without knowing anything about the Iraqi legal system. Among
their obstacles was the lack of Arabic language skill, which prevented
them from collecting any information from the arrested individuals.45
Also the procedural differences made it almost impossible for the CPA to
administer policing functions properly. As one of the members of the
Judicial Reconstruction Assistance Team (JRAT) , a team created for
assisting the CPA with the reconstruction of criminal courts in Baghdad,
commented:
As far as the criminal justice system in Iraq, in March
2003 we knew it was supposed to run according to a
civil law system based upon a French model codified by
the Iraqi Penal code of 1969 and that criminal
procedure was pursuant to the Criminal Procedure
Code of 1972. What we did not know was how these laws
were in fact followed."46 To remedy many such
functional problems, the CPA went about introducing
44.
Hansjorg Strohmeyer. Col/apse and Reconstruction of Judicial System: The United
Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor 95 Am. I. InCI L. 46. 48-93 (2001).
Captain Travis Hall. From Autocracy to Democracy: The Effon to Establish Market
45.
Democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan. 33 Ga. I. InCI & Compo L. 157. 157-169 (2004).
46.
[d. at 159.
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changes in the system. Several political offenses were
suspended together with numerous procedural
changes'l7. Lack of expertise in few staff members were
tackled by a three-tier approach in UNTAET. Mandatory
week long training prior to appointments, ongoing
trainings and monitoring through an international team
of experts. 48

The challenges of reconstructing a judicial system in a conflict-ruined
country are also limitless. A similar scenario is found in testimony from
an East Timorese reconstruction team:
UNTAET staff members will never be able to forget the
panorama of devastation that awaited them upon their
arrival in East Timor: most public and many private
buildings ruined and smoldering in the midst of what
had once been towns and Villages, now all but
abandoned by their former inhabitants, cut off from
transport and communication, and lacking a
governmental superstructure. 49

One of the first priorities of that mission was to appoint judges and
prosecutors who are free from conflicts of interest. The reconstruction
team consisted of three East Timorese and two international experts and
was led by an East Timorese of high moral standards. The Transitional
Judicial Service Commission appointed candidates with the requisite
expertise and political acceptance among the people. 50 In the absence of
a working broadcasting system, the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNT AET)51 staff distributed leaflets
throughout the territory to invite applications from the citizenry.

47. CPA Order 7 of 9 June 2003 suspended many political offenses as well as capital
punishment while Memo no 3 amended the code of Criminal Procedure to allow rights to accused
previously unavailable under Iraqi law. For example, the right against self incrimination, the right to
remain silent, the right to be represented by an attorney and others were introduced to the Iraqi legal
system. See CPAlORD/9 June 2003/07 and CPAlMEMI27 June 2004/03.
http://www.iraqcoaJition.org/regulations/index.html#Regulations.
48.
See note 43, supra at 55-56.
49.
[d. at 50.
50.
[d. at 53.
51.
United Nation Transitional Administration in East Timor was established on 25 October
1999 to administer the territory, exercise legislative and executive authority during the transition
period. It was succeeded by United Nations Mission of Support of East Timor 22 May 2002 after
East Timor became an independent state. Complete description available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/etimor.htm.
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The Iraqi reconstruction approach, on the other hand, turned out to be
very different from any other similar cases of reconstruction. The
differences in attitude may have been the result of an unclear mandate.
Led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer ill, the CPA was created with the
primary responsibility of reconstruction of Iraq. "The lack of an
authoritative and unambiguous statement about how this organization
was established"52 was never resolved. The mandate was to exercise
powers of government temporarily during the transitional period. This
included restoring conditions of stability and security, creating
conditions for the Iraqi people to be able to determine their political
future through restoration, and establishment of national and local
institutions for representative government and facilitation of economic
recovery, sustainable reconstruction, and development. 53
In its
promulgated 12 regulations, 54 100 orders, 17 memoranda and 13 public
notices, the CPA exercised its authority as vested through the SC,
sometimes going outside the sphere of its mandate. The true identity of
such an institution may seem less important than its mission under the
circumstances, but its long running effect is undeniable. Lack of a
founding institution may have allowed the CPA officials, more
specifically the Administrator, to evade accountability and face possible
consequences for the mismanagement of issues. 55
Sharing his experience as CPA senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of
Justice, John C. Williamson drew a comparison between the mandate
under the United Nations Mission In Kosovo(UNMIK)56 and the Iraq
transitional authority. 57 In the case of UNMIK's justice agenda, justice
and police powers were reserved to the United Nations, while
management and control of the justice system was firmly within the
control of the international community, much like in UNTAET. In the
52.
L. Elaine Halchin, The coalition Provisional Authority: Origin, Characteristics, and
Institutional authorities, CRS Report for Congress April 29, 2004 available at
http://www.fas.orglman/crsIRL32370.pdf.
53.
CPNREGII6 May 2003/01 Section I Para 1.
54.
The official CPA website defines 'Regulations' as instruments that define the institutions
and authorities of the CPA; 'Orders' as binding instructions or directives to the Iraqi people that
create penal consequences or have a direct bearing on the way Iraqis are regulated, including
changes to Iraqi law; 'Memoranda' as expand on Orders or Regulations by creating or adjusting
procedures applicable to an Order or Regulation; 'Public Notices' as the intentions of the
Administrator to the public and may require adherence to security measures that have no penal
consequence or reinforces aspects of existing law that the CPA intends to enforce.
55. The CPA was accountable to the Department of Defense of the United States. The UN or
the Iraqi people had no authority over the institution thus no way of evaluating its performance.
56.
United Nations Mission in Kosovo was established on 10 June 1999 to establish an interim
civil administration in the war-tom province of Kosovo. Complete description available at
http://www.unmikonline.orglintro.htrn.
57.
Daniel Bodansky, Establishing rule of law in post conflict Iraq: Rebuilding the Justice
System, 33 Ga. J. Int'!. & Compo L. 119,229-244 (2004).
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Iraqi situation, the mandate was very unclear and the CPA exercised full
control over the system, instead of having the planned advisory role, in
order to fill the power vacuum created by the fleeing of senior
government officials.
Under the same ambiguous mandate, the T A went about introducing
changes in the legal education system of Iraq.58 They identified
programs including improving the infrastructure of and materials
available in libraries, changing outdated law school curriculums,
organizing conferences about recent legal subjects, and introducing
clinical legal education. Rather than concentrating on the immediate
need, CPA went about changing the basic structure.

V. CONCLUSION
Considering the difficult environment in Iraq and cultural challenges
faced by the T A at the beginning of its reconstruction effort, it must be
hailed as a praiseworthy one. Even with its shortcomings and criticisms,
the IHT can be considered as an important milestone for international
criminal law. Though Saddam Hussein's trial was not a purely fair one,
it also met many international standards and, as such, was not an unfair
trial either. His conviction is likely to serve as a deterrent for many
abusive governments around the world. International and regional
experts may have played an important role in the judicial reconstruction
that was essentially consistent with the mandate. In this context, I would
like to present the following conclusions.
A. THE IRAQI TRIBUNAL
PROSECUTION STANDARD

MET THE

lNTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

With its combination of international criminal law and Iraqi domestic
procedure, this tribunal may serve as a model for other countries willing
to deal with past violations of international humanitarian law. However,
the tribunal still has some improvements to make. Abandoning the
provision for capital punishment and allowing longer periods for appeal
are a couple of issues that need to be revisited. Further, while the
inclusion of international and regional experts added to the legitimacy of
the court, the inherent problem of legitimacy of this court is precisely
captured by Adel Safty:
58.
Haider Ala Hamoudi, Toward a Rule of Law Society in Iraq: Introducing Clinical Legal
Education into Iraqi Law Schools, 23 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 112, 112-136 (2005) (mentions that he
went to Baghdad as a part of a team of educators sent by De Paul University's International Human
Rights Law Institute (D-IRLl) to reform and improve legal education).
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"(The) Iraqi Governing Council has been appointed by
the occupying power; it has not been elected by the
people. In this sense, it cannot claim to be competent to
render justice on behalf of the people of Iraq. Therefore,
the criminal tribunal set up by the Iraqi Governing
Council does not meet the test of "independence and
impartiality. "59
Whereas this court will have to carry the stigma even after being
reestablished by the elected assembly for years to come, other countries
may use the same model as a prerogative of sovereign power.
B.

THE TRIAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN DEVIATED FROM THE GOAL OF
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE

According to Bassiouni, post-conflict justice includes "how the nation
responds to the systematic violations of the previous repressive regime,
how it deals with the regime's victims, and how it transforms yesterday'S
tragedies into lessons for tomorrow that will enhance future deterrence
and prevention."60 The need to address the violations of Saddam's
government was followed by establishing a Tribunal that drew upon
international criminal legal jurisprudence, but fell victim to the conduct
of some of the individuals involved. It is unfortunate that despite the
potential to enhance social reconciliation and promote unity among Iraqi
citizens, the trial of Saddam Hussein has served as an act of vengeance.
Completely ignoring reparation for the victims, it only contributed to
clashes between ethnic groups. Rather than addressing past wrongs, the
trial created many of its own. Though it satisfied few fair trial
requirements, the image of Saddam Hussein being taunted at his final
moments is likely to stay in people's minds as the legacy of the Tribunal.
The trial failed to satisfy victims of the crimes as there was no initiative
to address reparation or reconciliation issues. It also failed to offer
justice to victims of Saddam's other cruel campaigns, as he was executed
before being held liable for all of his atrocities.
C.

THE ROLE OF THE TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY

While reconstructing the justice system, the T A acted within its
authority, as it did not modify any fundamental provisions of law
previously existing in the country. Though it suspended a few provisions
59. Danielle Tarin, Prosecuting Saddam and Bungling Transitional Justice in Iraq,
45 Va. I. Int'I L. 467, 493 (2005).
60.
See note 15, supra at 335.
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and introduced many new ones, it stayed within the recognized mandate
by introducing fundamental changes in legal procedures, education, and
judicial accountability which will ultimately better an independent
judicial system.
In the end though, while the T A's efforts should not go unnoticed,
neutral international assistance, a focused trial, and most of all, waiting
for a duly elected government to set up the tribunal might have resulted
in a better process for holding Saddam accountable. Iraq may have
benefited from community courts or informal dispute settlement forums,
as they have proved to be successful in many post-conflict
environments. 61 Truth commission and other reconciliation forums for
victims both before the conflict and during the T A, would have served
the true purpose of post conflict justice in Iraq.

61.
Jennifer Widner, Courts and Democracy in Post Conflict Transitions: A Social Scientist's
Perspective on the African Case, 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 64, 64-75 (2001) (a discussion of various African
cases in which the community courts played positive roles in rebuilding the society).
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